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Since democracy took hold throughout the region of Latin America, the social reform 
strategies that these countries have used to mitigate long-standing inequalities is significantly 
varied. Some countries have consistently implemented progressive and gradual reforms while 
others have rapidly pursued expansive or transformative social policy changes. Through the 
analysis of thirteen Latin American countries finds that – rather than prevailing explanations 
focused on mass demands and the organization of the working class and political left – social 
policy trajectories are caused by dynamics between party systems and elections. In countries 
where party systems are institutionalized and elections become highly competitive, parties 
increase their competiveness vis-à-vis other political opponents by seeking electoral rewards 
throughout the promotion of incremental and redistributive policies. In contrast, in countries 
where inchoate party systems and weakly contested elections are the norm, populism takes root 
and populist leaders will pursue expansive social reforms that rely on social spending in order to 
consolidate their fluid political coalitions once reaching office. Over time, countries with 
institutionalized party systems and competitive elections will implement gradual and progressive 
social policies while those with inchoate party systems and low electoral competition will enact 






















Dating as far back as Aristotle, inequality and redistribution have long been sources of 
deep theoretical and substantive interest to scholars of political science. Redistribution has 
become especially salient to those interested in studying the developing world, particularly 
regions that have traditionally suffered such high socioeconomic inequalities as Latin America. 
Recently many Latin American governments have attempted to curb inequality through the 
implementation of social policies and programs. Much of the scholarly focus on social reform 
has centered on bottom-up theoretical approaches that stress redistributive demands from the 
masses or the political organization of the working class and political left. Yet, major social 
reforms in Latin America are predominantly formulated and initiated by close networks of high-
ranking politicians, ministers, and technocrats. Why are existing academic theories so 
disconnected from the empirical reality of social reform in the region? What incentives are really 
driving political elites towards implementing equity-enhancing reforms in Latin America? 
 This article shows that recent trajectories of social policy in Latin America are shaped by 
the institutionalization of party systems and the competitiveness of elections within countries. 
The main finding is that – since the advent of democracy throughout the region in the 1980s and 
1990s – countries with stable party systems and competitive elections have consistently pursued 
gradual social reforms while those with inchoate party systems and weakly competitive elections 
have implemented expansive social policies. To substantiate this argument, this article draws on 
classical arguments of institutionalization that illuminate how the strength of institutions and 
their interactions with one another profoundly affect political behavior and result in disparate 
policy outcomes across cases.  
 The existing literature on the politics of redistribution and social reform has difficulty 
explaining recent social policy trajectories in Latin America. Social conflict theory argues that 
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the expansion of universal suffrage induces redistribution by allowing the newly enfranchised 
but less privileged lower and middle classes to vote for redistributive-seeking politicians 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; McGuire 2010). Pushing 
this reasoning one step further, advocates of power resource theory claim that only through the 
political organization of civil society and the formation of programmatic leftist parties can the 
balance of power shift towards the subordinate classes, which then results in greater 
redistribution and expansion of the welfare state (Stephens 1979; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Huber and Stephens 2012). Implicit in both these approaches is a bottom-up causal process 
where underprivileged citizens and subordinate classes push for redistributive policies to 
improve their socioeconomic positions. However, the vast majority of equity-enhancing policies 
that have been implemented during the last two or three decades in Latin America have been 
designed and implemented in a decisively top-down and highly technocratic manner.1 
Furthermore, even governments controlled by the political left have varied significantly in how 
they have approached redistribution and social policy reforms. 
 This article builds upon literature that has shown how party systems influence the 
economic policy-making process (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Mainwaring 1999; Flores-Macías 2012) and expands it into the realm of social policy. However, 
it deviates from this literature by embedding electoral competition within the party system 
institutionalization framework, arguing that both institutional and electoral dynamics shape 
political elites’ behavior in the formulation and implementation of social policy. Recent social 
reforms in Latin American countries have been initiated by politicians that seek to gain electoral 
                                                 
1. Most reforms to Latin American health care and education programs have been initiated and formulated by 
ministers, technocrats, bureaucrats, and top-level politicians (see Grindle 2004; Kaufman and Nelson 
2004). Similarly, the creation of conditional cash transfer programs has largely been top-down, 
technocratic, and outside the privy or demands of the masses (Franzoni and Voorend 2011).  
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advantages through ‘anticipated rewards.’ When institutionalized party systems spur more 
closely contested elections, party leaders and high-level politicians across the ideological 
spectrum propose incremental and progressive equity-enhancing policies to gain electoral 
rewards from unattached voters at the ballot box. In contrast, inchoate party systems that 
maintain low electoral competition allow space for the rise of populism. Because of the high 
degree of fluidity of populists’ electoral coalitions, these leaders seek to consolidate their 
followings through vast social spending projects and expansive social programs. 
 This article proceeds in the following manner. The next section defines social policy 
trajectories and presents the main empirical puzzle. Next, it shows how existing theories fail to 
account for recent patterns of social reform across Latin America. It then introduces the main 
theoretical contribution of the article, that dynamics between party systems and electoral 
competition create consistent paths of social policies. Then, the empirical section substantiates 
the argument through both cross-national patterns of social reforms and more detailed 
investigation of thirteen Latin American cases. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main 
findings and discusses the broader implications of the theory. 
Social Policy Trajectories in Latin America 
 There have been two overarching methodological approaches to the study of social 
reform and welfare states in Latin America. One approach seeks to explain the political 
determinants behind changes in social expenditure across a large number of cases (Brown and 
Hunter 1999; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Huber, 
Mustillo, and Stephens 2008). Although these studies illuminate broader economic and political 
causes of variation in government spending, they typically fall short of providing deep 
theoretical and causal explanations for changes in social policy. Social spending – often 
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measured as total government expenditure on social programs as a percentage of GDP per capita 
– does not capture the complexities of the social reforms that countries enact over time. For 
example, countries may have similar levels and patterns of social expenditures but implement 
significantly different types of social reforms during this time period.2 Another approach has 
sought to investigate how social reform – and particularly the extent of its movement towards 
ideals of ‘universalism’ – has occurred in smaller sets of countries or cases (Grindle 2004; 
Castiglioni 2005; Hunter and Sugiyama 2009; Pribble 2013). While this approach addresses the 
shortcoming of the previous by yielding deeper theoretical insights into how political actors and 
processes have directly shaped social reforms, it lacks the empirical breadth to generalize across 
greater sets of cases and connect with broader regional trends of policy reform.  
 This article takes a different approach to understanding changes in social policy. It 
occupies an empirical middle ground that utilizes in-depth analysis of social reforms across 
thirteen cases to understand both causal political relationships and larger patterns of reform 
throughout an entire region. Rather than investigating social spending or socioeconomic and 
policy outcomes (e.g. universalism of policies, poverty reduction), it investigates the scope of 
policy inputs. In other words, the primary focus of the investigation rests on why countries 
exhibit similar patterns in the type of social policies they pursue and implement. 
 Social policy trajectories are defined as patterns of social reform that are formulated and 
enacted by successive governments over a given period of time. Of particular importance is the 
scope – the extensiveness and pace – of social reforms. Reforms that continue to expand upon 
each other from previous iterations and are implemented over a number of years are considered 
                                                 
2. Among the countries where social expenditure data is available (all cases included in this study with the 
exceptions of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras), all ten have incrementally increased social public 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP since 1990. Yet, these ten countries have followed vastly different 
approaches to social policy reform during this time period. Source: Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPALSTAT/ECLAC).  
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gradual social policy trajectories. Conversely, expansive social policy trajectories entail sudden 
shifts in existing programs or the creation of new transformative programs within a short period 
of time. Examples of gradual trajectories would be the social assistance programs of Bolsa 
Escola and Progresa in Brazil and Mexico. Originally a set of unrelated and independent social 
fund initiatives created by previous administrations, these programs were later consolidated and 
expanded upon by successive governments over the course of several years. Alternatively, the 
major decentralization projects in education enacted in multiple countries in the early 1990s that 
fundamentally altered educational systems are examples of expansive reforms. 
 Since the dual waves of democracy and neoliberal economic reforms swept the region in 
the 80s and 90s, there have been two general and distinct paths for how countries have 
implemented equity-enhancing reforms: some countries have pursued piecemeal (and typically 
progressive) social reforms gradually and others have sought to implement transformative social 
programs rapidly. These two paths have been commonly referred to as the ‘two Latin America 
lefts.’ The Bolivarian populists – Chávez, Correa, and Morales – invested in large-scale shifts in 
policy, funnelling discretionary funds towards poorer segments of society while moderate leftist 
governments – such as those in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay – implemented consistent but gradual 
reforms to healthcare, education, and social assistance programs. However, these trajectories are 
not limited to the political left. Right-wing populists such as Fujimori and Menem sought major 
changes to education while center-right administrations in Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico have 
pursued progressive but incremental reforms to healthcare and social assistance. Why do we see 
such divergent trajectories of social policy reform since 1990 across Latin America? Why do 
certain countries repeatedly pursue expansive and rapid social reforms? Why do others 
implement policies that incrementally build off of each other over long periods of time? 
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The Politics of Redistribution and Policy Reform 
There are two main theoretical approaches that have been put forth to explain how 
political dynamics shape redistribution and policy change: social conflict theory and power 
resource theory. Because neither of these two theories provides an encompassing explanation for 
recent social policy trajectories in Latin America, this article develops an alternative theory that 
highlights the role of party system institutionalization in shaping social policy reforms.  
Social Conflict Theory 
 Social conflict theory argues that democracy creates inherent electoral incentives for 
redistribution (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; McGuire 2010). Largely based on the 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) median voter model, the social conflict approach claims that the 
expansion of universal suffrage to the previously disenfranchised but more populous subordinate 
classes allows these groups to exert greater political clout than the numerically challenged elites. 
In unequal countries where lower and middle classes possess aggregate incomes lower than the 
national average, these voters will persistently vote for representatives that favor greater 
redistribution and expansion of the welfare state (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Considering the 
voting power of the subordinate classes, it then follows that the legislative and executive 
branches will represent these groups to a greater degree than the economically privileged. 
Therefore, over time democracy will cater to the economically disadvantaged causing increases 
in redistributive social policies and the expansion of the welfare state. 
 Although the establishment of democracy across the region has generally led to greater 
advances in social reform, the main assumptions behind social conflict theory do not explain 
why some countries pursue different approaches to social reform than others. Despite staggering 
levels of inequality, low income levels have not automatically transformed into strong 
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distributive demands among Latin Americans (Blofield and Luna 2011).3 Moreover, the mere 
presence of voting does not guarantee the adequate representation of subordinate political 
groups. Throughout the region, political representation is typically deficient (O’Donnell 1994), 
clientelism continues to hinder the organization of the socioeconomically fragmented lower 
classes (Weyland 1996), and political elites often restrict the growth of left-leaning political 
parties (Mainwaring 1999). Secondly, strength of democracy does not correlate to social policy 
trajectories among Latin American countries. Based on participatory and electoral measures,4 
three of the weakest democracies in the region – El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico – have 
followed similar trends of progressive and gradual social reforms as highly democratic Brazil, 
Chile, and Uruguay. At the same time, Argentina, despite being ranked as one of the strongest 
democracies in the region, has pursued a path of expansive social reforms similar to the much 
less democratic Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Power Resource Theory 
 Overcoming the simplicity of the median voter model, power resource theory stresses the 
importance of political organization among subordinate classes for the effective advancement of 
redistributive demands. Derived mainly from the European experience, power resource theory 
argues that democracy allows for the organization of civil society, namely organized labor and 
programmatic political parties, to shift the balance of power towards the subordinate classes so 
that their demands can effectively influence the government (Stephens 1979; Huber and 
Stephens 2001). Only through working-class organization and the formation of programmatic 
                                                 
3. Blofield and Luna (2011) find that aggregate redistributive preferences are lower in Latin America than 
Europe despite significantly higher levels of inequality. Furthermore, although redistributive preferences 
have minimally increased in recent years, the region remains significantly polarized with portions of the 
population continuing to support greater levels of inequality. 
4. The measures used here are aggregate measures – electoral democracy and participatory democracy – from 
the Varieties of Democracy Project. Taken together, the measures accurately account for the main causal 
mechanisms put forth by the median-voter model. 
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social democratic parties can underprivileged groups effectively influence the government to 
adopt more equitable economic and social policies. In the context of Latin America, Huber and 
Stephens (2012) argue that countries that have a strong presence of left-based political parties in 
government will achieve more redistributive policies and the reduction of poverty and inequality. 
 Like social conflict theory, the capacity of power resource theory to explain recent Latin 
American social policy trajectories is limited. The corporatist dominance by the state over 
organized labor and recent neoliberal reforms have significantly reduced the capacity of the 
working class to organize (Collier 1999; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005). Consequently, labor 
remains fragmented and weakly organized as labor density continues to decline since the 
industrialization periods of the mid-20
th
 century (Weyland 1996; Cook 2007; Schneider and 
Karcher 2010). Huber and Stephens (2012) shift the focus of power resource theory from unions 
to the strength of programmatic left parties as the key causal variable in explaining social 
reforms among Latin American countries. However, there is no clear linkage between the 
presence of leftist parties and social policy trajectories in Latin America. Among the gradual 
reformers, many of the first steps in the reform trajectory were implemented by center-right 
politicians in a highly technocratic fashion. Furthermore, perhaps the most expansive 
redistributive policies in the region – in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – 
have been implemented by populist and fluid party organizations. In a region rife with 
fragmented classes, the bottom-up organization of civil society has faced a number of constraints 
that have limited the ability of the middle and lower classes to achieve redistributive social 
policy. 
Party Systems and Policy Reform 
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 Institutionalization has long been linked to the stability of policy outputs among 
developing countries (Huntington 1968; O’Donnell 1994). Although primarily focused on 
economic reform, dynamics within party systems have been theorized to greatly impact the 
policy-making process (Huntington 1968; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999; 
Flores-Macías 2012). For example, fragmented party systems reduce policy coherence among 
the legislative branch, preventing the executive from being able to build coalitions and pass their 
policy agendas (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999). Flores-Macías (2012) argues 
that greater party system institutionalization generates centripetal incentives towards moderate 
policy reforms. Regularity and repeated exposure among parties increases their negotiation and 
cooperation with one another allowing them to more efficiently coalesce and leading to more 
moderate policy outputs (Flores-Macías 2010, 421). Furthermore, institutionalized parties’ strong 
roots in society and legitimacy, as well as their institutional barriers to entry for outside or 
inexperienced politicians, restricts the latitude in decision-making of party leaders (Flores-
Macías 2010, 420-422). Therefore, governments that hail from institutionalized party systems 
will pursue moderate economic reforms while those from inchoate party systems implement 
more radical economic policies. 
Although the party systems literature sheds light on understanding policy-making from 
an institutional and top-down approach, their causal mechanisms do not easily apply to recent 
social policy trajectories. Legislative coalitions have played a fairly limited role in the 
formulation and passage of social reforms. Rather, the crucial coalitions behind the initiation of 
policy reforms in Latin America have often been among high-level politicians, ministers, and 
technocrats (Schneider 2004; Franzoni and Voorend 2011). Indeed, countries that rely heavily on 
legislative coalitions – such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay – have pursued 
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widely divergent paths of social reform. Secondly, the relationship between party system 
institutionalization and strong roots in society among Latin American party systems is not as 
robust as previously thought.5 For example, electoral volatility in Brazil and Chile is 
exceptionally low but their parties do not exhibit particularly strong linkages or partisan 
identification with the electorate (Luna 2014a; Samuels and Zucco 2014). Yet, Brazil and Chile 
share nearly identical trajectories of gradual social reforms as other strongly rooted party systems 
such as El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay.  
In conclusion, neither the bottom-up nor the party systems approach comprehensively 
explains social policy trajectories. Social conflict and power resource theories, despite 
highlighting different causal processes, emphasize the demands of the masses for inducing 
redistribution but do not provide an explanation for the elite-driven and technocratic nature of 
recent social reforms in Latin America. On the other hand, the institutional approaches can 
potentially shed light on top-down processes of policy formulation but undervalue the integral 
role that electoral incentives shape political behavior within party systems. This article seeks to 
bridge this theoretical divide. Electoral incentives – such as those put forth by the median-voter 
model – do matter, but their effects are distorted by the dynamics of existing political institutions 
such as party systems. However, the theory offered here breaks away from the party system 
literature by placing less emphasis on institutional and intra-party constraints on behavior and 
instead focuses on how both elections and competition within party systems shapes incentives for 
politicians to enact social reforms. 
Party Systems and Social Policy Trajectories 
                                                 
5. Although strong roots in society was originally included as an integral component of party system 
institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), Luna (2014b) found that measures of electoral volatility 
and roots in society were not strongly correlated with one another in Latin America. 
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 In the developing world, many democracies continue to lack stable and well-functioning 
political parties capable of forging linkages between typically fragmented classes and social 
groups. However, among the countries that do possess a threshold of party system 
institutionalization, parties are well-organized and rooted in society and elections over time 
become more competitive. Amidst these environments of institutionalization and competition, 
major parties are incentivized to strengthen their relative electoral positions by aggressively 
capturing votes from new constituents. It outcompete their opponents, political leaders seek to 
gain ‘anticipated rewards’ by appealing to unattached voters through the promotion of 
progressive redistributive policy proposals. When parties are weak, ephemeral, and possess 
porous roots with the electorate, electoral competition becomes sporadic and less competitive. 
The low barriers of entry and competition of these party systems allows for the rise of populists 
to win elections. Once reaching office, populists seek to consolidate their fluid electoral 
coalitions through the implementation of transformative policy shifts and targeting key 
constituents through excessive social spending. In turn, countries with institutionalized party 
systems follow trajectories of gradual social reform while those with inchoate systems are placed 
on paths of expansive policy reforms.  
Institutionalized Party Systems and Gradual Reforms 
 Party systems become institutionalized when their constituent parts meet a certain 
threshold of legitimacy, organization, and possessing roots in society (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995). Over time, support among voters for parties crystallizes and parties embody certain 
ideological and symbolic values that represent their key constituencies. When multiple parties 
perform this task of becoming entrenched and developing linkages with portions of the 
electorate, the margin of victory reduces and elections become more competitive. Granted, 
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elections can be closely matched in weakly institutionalized party systems, but only in 
institutionalized party systems are large-scale electoral shifts elusive therefore spurring elections 
that are regularly contested among similar sets of parties. However, the key component of party 
system institutionalization – regularized competition among parties – does not necessarily imply 
that all segments of society are adequately represented. Even the most stable party systems host 
portions of the electorate that remain independent of staunch partisanship or party affiliation. 
Therefore, when competition between major parties is high and elections are consistently 
contested, parties will seek to augment their electoral support by reaching out to new and 
unattached constituents.  
 Within the context of stable party systems, highly competitive elections incentivize all 
major parties to pursue ‘anticipated rewards’ from voters by incorporating equity-enhancing 
policies in their electoral platforms and legislative agendas. Anticipated rewards are the electoral 
fruits that politicians and their parties receive after creating programs that successively alleviate 
socioeconomic problems. In a region rife with inequality and poverty, political actors that 
formulate technocratic and redistributive policy initiatives addressing socioeconomic issues are 
often handsomely rewarded at the ballot box (Cerda and Vergara 2008; De la O 2013; Zucco 
2013). Thus, competition elections with small margins of victory entice both right- and left-wing 
parties to pursue progressive social policies in an attempt to outcompete one another. However, 
redistribution and social policy remain economically costly. Therefore, in order to compete in 
close elections political parties make calculated decisions to promote incremental and cost-
effective social reforms. What results is the regularized implementation of gradual social reforms 
by successive governments over time. In turn, consistent with the median-voter model, 
democratic elections can spur redistributive outcomes. However, only when a threshold of party 
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system institutionalization is reached and contested elections are commonplace are political 
actors truly incentivized to provide public goods to the masses in a consistent fashion.  
Inchoate Party Systems and Expansive Reforms 
 Inchoate party systems suffer from a lack (or complete absence) of parties with 
organization, legitimacy, and durable party-citizen linkages throughout society (Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995). The ephemeral and precarious nature of political parties and lack of crystallization 
of linkages in these party systems results in significant volatility in voting patterns and electoral 
competition becomes less robust. The likelihood of political outsiders and populists entering 
weakly institutionalized and uncompetitive party systems is significantly higher (Kaufman and 
Stallings 1991; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Weyland 1999). Where stable, well-financed, and 
organized parties prevail, populist leaders are extremely hard-pressed to form organizations 
capable of successfully competing in national elections. Furthermore, the party-citizen linkages 
and weak competition among parties allows transient outsiders to entice unattached followers 
with greater ease. Particularly in periods of governability or socioeconomic crisis, populists can 
entice swaths of disenchanted voters by appealing to anti-system sentiments. 
 While weak party systems and electoral competition allows populists to win elections, the 
high fluidity of their political support brings rise to incentives for the pursuit of expansive social 
reforms buttressed by massive social spending. Although populists are capable of rapidly 
garnering support, the lack of institutionalized organization of typically disparate social 
groupings with different interests makes these coalitions difficult to maintain post-election. 
Populists heavily rely on anti-system rhetoric and sentiment to drum up electoral support 
(Mayorga 2006), often making their political survival predicated on the delivery of sweeping 
changes to placate the disillusionment of their supporters. Furthermore, because of the loose 
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linkages between populists and voters, populists will seek to solidify their coalitions through 
large-scale social programs that especially reward their political kin. In turn, populist leaders 
make widespread use of discretionary social spending that targets heavily relied upon 
constituents – especially the urban and rural lower classes – during campaigns (Weyland 1999, 
391-392).  
 In conclusion, the institutionalization of party systems and the subsequent level of 
electoral competition profoundly shape the social policy trajectories that countries follow. The 
theory advanced here expects that in countries with institutionalized party systems and 
competitive elections all major parties within the system will implement progressive and gradual 
social reforms. In contrast, countries with inchoate party systems and weak electoral competition 
will follow paths of consistent populism that imposes expansive social reforms that favor vast 
social spending.  
Explaining Social Policy Trajectories 
 The two social policy trajectories identified in this article are distinguished through the 
in-depth investigation of social reforms – through primary sources, such as legislation and policy 
reforms, and secondary sources – of thirteen Latin American countries since 1990. These 
trajectories cover three domains of social policy: healthcare, education, and non-contributory 
social assistance. The time period, 1990 to 2015, allows for a long-term perspective on how 
social policies have evolved over multiple decades; moreover, nearly all (with the exception of 
Mexico’s gradual democratization) the countries included in the dataset qualify as democracies 
with regular and fair elections. The extended time period and the medium-N design allows for a 
couple of distinct advantages. First, the qualitative analysis is not confined to one economic 
period – such as the 1990s when neoliberal reforms were implemented throughout the region – 
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that would constrain the variation in social reform trajectories. Secondly, the extension of cases 
away from paired comparisons or small-N designs allows for a much more controlled method of 
comparison (in terms of potential intervening causes).  
 At their core, social policy trajectories fundamentally differ by their degrees of 
extensiveness in reforms. Accordingly, the criteria that guide the coding of trajectories are: (1) 
do social reforms show a pattern of incremental changes that accumulate over successive 
administrations, or (2) are changes to social programs the result of one major reform that 
profoundly transforms how that particular social policy is administrated? When taking into  









Argentina Low (20.61) Low (42.09) 0 1 1 2 
Bolivia Low (39.76) Low (41.98) 0 1 1 2 
Colombia Low (31.99) Low (35.02) 1 1 1 3 
Ecuador Low (29.22) Low (32.17) 1 0 1 2 
Peru Low (46.70) Low (29.98) 0 1 1 2 
Venezuela Low (40.85) Low (27.96) 1 1 0 2 
       
Brazil High (14.50) High (20.98) 0 1 0 1 
Chile High (15.12) High (18.48) 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica Low (21.42) High (24.12) 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador High (14.73) High (23.29) 0 0 0 0 
Honduras High (14.95) High (19.62) 0 1 0 1 
Mexico High (15.94) High (8.43) 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay High (13.21) High (21.65) 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 1: Party Systems and Social Policy Trajectories in Latin America 
 
                                                 
6. Party system institutionalization is measured by legislative electoral volatility. The measure is the average 
of electoral volatility since 1990. Data graciously provided by Scott Mainwaring; see: Mainwaring, 
Gervasoni, and España-Najera 2016. 
7. Level of competition is measured by the margin of victory in both presidential and lower chamber elections 
(in countries that utilize run-off presidential elections, only first rounds were included in the calculation). 
Margin of victory is the percentage of the vote received by the winner minus the percentage of the vote 
received by the runner-up. The final score is the average margin of victory since 1990. Data collected by 
author. Source: Nohlen 2005 and various government election data sites. 
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account timeframes of twenty-five years, overarching patterns of social reform become relatively 
evident. Healthcare and education reforms typically fall into two categories: gradual reforms that 
targeted incremental changes in certain aspects (i.e. coverage, efficiency, or funding) or 
expansive reforms that made significant changes to either centralize or decentralize their 
healthcare or education programs. The one exception is Venezuela, which implemented two new 
programs (Barrio Adentro and Robinson), supplementing the existing health and education 
frameworks. Social assistance trajectories were coded as gradual if cash transfer programs were 
the result of initiatives by multiple administrations, their coverage rates increased incrementally, 
and were largely funded by mandatory and stable sources of income. In contrast, non-
contributory programs that were created in a short period of government action, had coverage 
rates that were initially high or increased rapidly, and were funded by primarily discretionary 
funds were coded as expansive. In each of the three social reform categories a score of 0 
(gradual) or 1 (expansive) is given. After simple arithmetic, a final score from 0 (lowest) to 3 
(highest) is calculated. 
 Table 1 shows the variation of party system institutionalization, level of competition, and 
social policy trajectories among the thirteen cases. As predicted, party system institutionalization 
and the competitiveness of elections are strong related to one another (ρ = .59). The most stable 
party systems in Latin America – such as Brazil, Chile, Honduras, and Mexico – routinely 
experience extremely close elections in both the executive and legislative branches. Conversely, 
inchoate party systems in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia regularly 
experience substantial margins of victories. More crucially to the theory advocated here, both 
party system institutionalization (ρ = .74) and electoral competition (ρ = .77) are positively and 
strongly correlated with social reform trajectories. The countries with the most gradual 
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trajectories of social reform (Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay) possess 
some of the lowest electoral volatility and margins of victory averages in the region. In contrast, 
countries that have pursued expansive reforms in more than one category (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela) have the most volatile party systems and uncompetitive elections. 
 Alternative theories of social policy trajectories do not have much explanatory power. 
Economic growth is negatively and weakly associated with social reforms (ρ = -.27).8 This 
finding is not surprising considering that in many instances countries have implemented reforms 
due to poor socioeconomic conditions – for example, Argentina and Colombia both pursued 
expansive social assistance programs during deep economic recessions. Relative levels of 
economic development are not significant (ρ = -.36).9 Interestingly, the robustness of electoral 
democracy has a negative and weak association with social policy trajectories (ρ = -.33).10 This 
result, although somewhat surprising, is not disconnected from the empirical record. Some of the 
‘weakest’ democracies among the sample – El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico – have followed 
similarly gradualist trajectories as many of the most democratic – Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. 
Strength of left has no predictability with regards to the extensiveness of social reform (ρ = 
.07).11 Governments from all political ideologies have pursued both gradual and expansive social 
reforms throughout Latin America. 
Institutionalized, Competitive Party Systems and Gradual Reforms 
 Although there are degrees of differences in the institutionalization and competitiveness 
of party systems among the gradual reformers, all seven countries – Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El 
                                                 
8. Economic growth is measured by total average GDP growth per capital since 1990. Source: World Bank. 
9. Level of development is measured by total average GDP per capita since 1990. Source: World Bank. 
10. Democracy is measured by total average scores of the ‘electoral democracy index’ since 1990. Source: 
Varieties of Democracy. 
11. Strength of left is measured by percent of total executive administrations that were controlled by a leftist 
candidate since 1990. The ideology of presidents is coded based on an ideology scheme developed by 
Michael Coppedge. Source: Coppedge 1998. 
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Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay – have three commonalities: stable and 
institutionalized party systems, robust and competitive elections, and a consistent record of 
progressive and incremental social reform since 1990. 
 Throughout Latin America, CCT programs have brought significant rewards to the policy 
designers and political incumbents (Hunter and Power 2007; Cerda and Vergara 2008; Zucco 
2013), providing opportunities for parties involved in highly competitive elections to increase 
their political support. It is not surprising then that the three counties that pioneered CCT 
programs in Latin America – Brazil, Honduras, and Mexico – implemented their programs under 
the auspices of stable party systems and tight competition among parties and political leaders. 
Brazil – once characterized as an inchoate party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Mainwaring 1999) – has since significantly stabilized with the emergence of both the center-
right Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and the center-left Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT). In turn, the small margin of victories between the PSDB and PT in 
legislative and presidential elections has led to both parties competing against each other to 
increase their electoral support. Often heralded as a PT flagship program, Bolsa Família was 
actually born out of intense policy competition between the PSDB and the PT parties at both the 
local and federal levels (Melo 2008). The foundations of the program were first implemented by 
PSDB president Cardoso as Bolsa Escola, then consolidated and expanded by Lula after taking 
control of the presidency in 2003.  
 Similar contexts of electoral and policy competition between parties have led to the birth 
of CCTs in Mexico and Honduras. Despite the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)’s 
political dominance for over seven decades, gradual democratization has led to a robust and 
competitive three-party system shared by the PRI, the center-right Partido Accíón Nacional 
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(PAN) and the left-wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). In an effort to draw 
increased electoral support for the PAN from political rival PRI, president Fox renamed, 
consolidated, and augmented Progresa to create Oportunidades (De la O 2013). The oligarchic 
and highly competitive two-party system in Honduras has led to initiatives by both major parties 
– the Partido Nacional and the Partido Liberal – to implement and build upon previous CCT 
programs. Regardless of which party had control of the executive branch, each new version of 
CCT (from PRAF-I, to PRAF-II, to Bono 10,000) continued to expand the coverage, eligibility, 
and increase the payment scheme (Linos 2013). In turn, Galiani et al. (2016) found that newer 
iterations of the CCT have increased incumbency advantage for politicians of the party in power. 
 Contested elections in the context of institutionalized party systems have also resulted in 
governments pursuing incremental and progressive healthcare and education reforms. The stable 
yet highly competitive elections of Chile between the Concertación and Alianza have provided 
incentives for center-right parties such as Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and center-left 
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) to propose social reforms from above that entice lower and 
middle classes to support them electorally (Luna 2014a, 329-332). For example, health care 
reform (AUGE) was made a significant component of the political platform of presidential 
candidate Lagos in a tightly contested election, primarily for its potential to spur support among 
large portions of the electorate (McGuire 2010, 118; Pribble 2013, 49). Under president 
Bachelet, the Concertación then built on the success of AUGE and expanded its coverage. 
Similarly in Costa Rica, amidst a razor-thin margin of victory by the PLN presidential candidate 
Figueres – in which he stressed healthcare reform while his political opponent Rodríguez did not 
– resulted in a number of reform initiatives once he reached office (McGuire 2010, 89).  In 
Uruguay, the return to democracy brought increased competition from the electoral coalition of 
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Frente Amplio (FA) as a challenge to the stabilized competition of the traditional two-party 
system. A tightly contested election in 1994 and the saliency of education in the presidential 
campaign (Irazábal 2004) resulted in the implementation of universal preschool by the Partido 
Colorado under president Sanguinetti and minister Rama (Mancebo 1998; Priddle 2013, 107). 
Once in power, the FA continue to build on the foundation of health reforms established by the 
Partido Colorado, achieving gradual advances in healthcare that have increased coverage for the 
entire population (Borraz and González 2009; Castiglioni 2010). 
Among countries that have followed the gradual path of reform, the progressive social 
policies that these countries have pursued are not the result of a monopoly from the left. Instead, 
the institutionalization of party systems and the development of contested elections have 
incentivized political parties across the ideological spectrum – including the right – to pursue 
equity-enhancing policies. Increased institutionalization and competition from the leftist Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional after the reinstallation of democracy in El 
Salvador induced the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) to pursue 
progressive policies to maintain electoral majorities. The education reforms enacted over a 
period of ten years by the ARENA administrations of Cristiani, Calderón Sol, and Flores focused 
on increasing spending, enrollment and coverage, improving teacher training, and carrying out 
decentralization (Cuéllar-Marchelli 2003; Guzmán 2005). Furthermore, ARENA candidate Saca 
promoted the implementation of a CCT, Red Solidaria, during the 2004 elections and later 
implemented it after taking power (Britto 2007). In Mexico, after the first electoral victory of a 
non-PRI presidential candidate in over seven decades, the right-win PAN implemented 
healthcare reforms that increased public expenditures and coverage among the uninsured 
(Gakidou et al. 2006). Furthermore, many other right-wing and centrist governments – such as 
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Cardoso in Brazil, Sanguinetti in Uruguay, and Menem in Argentina - laid the foundations for 
initial reforms that leftist governments would subsequently build upon. Recent social reforms 
have largely been driven by party and electoral competition, not by ideology, in Latin America. 
Inchoate Party Systems and Expansive Reforms 
Inchoate party systems and weakly competitive elections among six countries – 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela – have led to surges in populist 
governance resulting in the pursuit of highly visible and expansive social policies. Nowhere in 
Latin America has there been a more vivid connection between inchoate party systems, 
populism, and expansive social policy than in the so-called ‘Bolivarian Revolutions’ of Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela. Once one of the most institutionalized and stable party systems in the 
region (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), Venezuela’s traditional parties fell into disarray in the late 
1990s. Amidst this political vacuum and in the context of socioeconomic crisis, Hugo Chávez 
was able to effectively mobilize disenchanted voters and win the 1998 election. However, 
because of the fluid nature of Chávez’s electoral support, he sought to solidify his legitimacy by 
creating highly visible and massive social assistance programs. A series of programs – the 
Misiones – were rolled out largely funded by oil revenue windfalls that focused on redistributing 
wealth and improving socioeconomic standards in health, education, and social well-being 
(Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011). Flagship programs such as Barrio Adentro and Robinson 
were supplemented with other Misiones to funnel substantial funds to low income populations, 
especially political supporters of Chávez (Penfold-Becerra 2007).  
Although on a smaller scale than Venezuela, both Bolivia and Ecuador have followed 
similar paths of populist leaders emerging from inchoate party systems and implementing 
expansive social policies fuelled by discretionary funds. Capitalizing on Ecuador’s amorphous, 
22 
 
fragmented, and weak party system (Conaghan 1995), Correa was able to win the 2006 election 
despite running on a ticket (Alianza PAIS) that did not put forth any congressional candidates. 
Similarly to Chávez, Correa quickly funnelled discretionary funds from oil profits towards social 
spending projects designed to increase his popularity. Within months of taking office, Correa 
doubled welfare payments and energy subsidies to the poor and declared ‘emergencies’ in many 
socioeconomic sectors that allowed the executive branch to disburse over $215 million to a 
number of ministries such as healthcare and education (Conaghan 2008, 55). Bolivia’s party 
system has long suffered instability, fragmentation, and a lack of coherency within political 
parties (Van Cott 2000). Rising up through an amalgamation of social movements and political 
activist groups – the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) – Evo Morales was able to secure an 
absolute majority in the 2005 general election. Since coming to power, Morales has followed the 
familiar path of extracting revenues from natural resources and channeling them towards 
transfers to school-age children (Bono Juancito Pinto) and unconditional funds for persons of old 
age (Renta Dignidad) (Gray Molina 2010, 66-67). Furthermore, MAS has enacted a law that 
proposes an expansive reformation of the Bolivian education system through the increased 
funding, expansion, and centralization of the primary and secondary levels.12 
Although less ambitious and transformative than the Bolivarian cases, other countries 
with weak party systems and populist movements – namely Argentina, Colombia, and Peru – 
have also pursued highly visible and expansive social policies. The dominance of a 
heterogeneous and fluid Partido Justicialista (PJ) amidst an incoherent and uncompetitive 
opposition has undermined the institutionalization of Argentina’s party system (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2008). The lack of competition in Argentine elections and the dearth of institutional 
constraints on PJ leaders have allowed presidents significant latitude in decision-making. For 
                                                 
12. “La nueva Ley Educativa propone 10 cambios,” La Razón, January 29, 2013.  
23 
 
example, although Menem campaigned against neoliberal policies (Weyland 2003, 1102), he 
swiftly implemented the decentralization of education and enacted changes aiming to increase 
coverage competition among healthcare insurers (Huber and Stephens 2012, 164-165). The 
unpredictable ‘bait-and-switch’ tactics also occurred in the extremely inchoate party system of 
Peru. Fujimori, capitalizing in a political context devoid of any organized political parties, 
implemented a number of highly visible neoliberal reforms once taking power. Fujimori sought 
political support through the decentralization of the educational system and especially the 
construction of a large number of schools throughout the country (Ortiz de Zevallos et al. 1999).  
Even among the more progressive populist leaders, such as the Kircheners of Argentina 
and Gaviria of Colombia, weakly institutionalized party systems can result in highly 
transformative shifts in social policy. Colombia’s long tradition of heterogeneous parties built 
upon clientelist and patronage networks (Leongómez 2006) has – similar to Argentina – led to 
the rise of populism from within major political parties such as the Partido Liberal Colombiano 
(PLC). During a period of political turmoil, Gaviria implemented two extensive social reform 
packages – Ley 60 and Ley 100 – aimed to radically transform the education and healthcare 
systems of the country. One of the most ambitious social reforms in recent Latin American 
history, Ley 100 introduced obligatory health insurance to all Colombians and fundamentally 
shifted the administration of healthcare through decentralization (Ramírez 2004). Economic 
crises have spearheaded social assistance policy efforts in both Argentina and Colombia. In 
Colombia, economic downturn prompted the implementation and rapid coverage expansion of 
Familias en Acción by Pastrana (Villatoro 2005). In Argentina, the economic crisis of 2001 
prompted Duhalde to create the Plan Jefes y Jefas that rapidly provided over two million people 
with cash transfers (Huber and Stephens 2012, 188). The Kirchners would continue to introduce 
24 
 
new social assistance programs – such as Plan Familia and a universal child allowance – to 
increase the political support of the PJ (Pribble 2013, 156-157). Many of these social funds are 
much more likely to be distributed to provinces and regions that are controlled by Peronist 
political leaders (Giraudy 2007). Unlike the gradual reformers, non-contributory social assistance 
programs in these countries have been implemented rapidly with significant initial coverage rates 
and primarily been funded through discretionary financial sources.  
Conclusion 
 This article has shown how recent social policy trajectories in Latin America have been 
shaped by the institutionalization of party systems and subsequent competitiveness in elections. 
By introducing some degree of stability among major parties, party system institutionalization 
spurs greater competition during elections. These competitive elections incentivize major parties 
to expand their electoral shares by proposing incremental redistributive social reforms in the 
pursuit of anticipated rewards from voters. In contrast, when party systems are inchoate and 
elections become less competitive, the lack of barriers of entry allows populist leaders to win 
elections. Populists, who build electoral coalitions on fluid organization of a large array of 
groups, seek to consolidate their followings through the pursuit of expansive social policies 
focused on vast social spending. 
 The argument put forth in this article contributes to broader debates on how institutions 
and political competition shape redistribution. Simplistic models, such as those utilized by social 
conflict theory, have difficulty explaining complex political phenomena in the developing world 
on their own. Social conflict theory illuminates how electoral competition influences 
redistribution but the median-voter model does not function as straight-forwardly as suggested. 
In the contexts of weak societal organization and representation, along with fragmented social 
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classes, the mere presence of redistributive demands among subordinate groups does not 
automatically result in political actors adequately addressing them. This article has argued that a 
threshold of party system institutionalization needs to be present in order for redistributive 
demands to influence political elites. When party systems are institutionalized and electoral 
competition becomes robust, political actors will vie for electoral rewards by proposing 
redistributive policies as a method of gaining votes. However, in cases where party systems are 
inchoate, social reform can be unpredictable, sporadic, and not necessarily in a progressive 
direction regardless of high inequality or the degree of redistributive demands among the 
populace.  
 Although a number of theoretical approaches have made political parties integral to 
understanding policy-making, much greater attention needs to be placed on how competition 
among parties affects the process of redistribution and social reform. Recently, competition has 
been featured in theoretical accounts of the party literature (Flores-Macías 2012; Huber and 
Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013; Luna 2014a) but it often takes a backseat to arguments related to 
voter-party linkages, ideology, policy legacies, or intra-party dynamics. Recent social policy 
trajectories have not been driven by ideological or programmatic dimensions. Progressive 
policies have been pursued by both the left and the right. When policies have been implemented 
by the left, they have rarely been the result of concrete demands from the working class or 
popular masses. Rather, social reform has been formulated within tight technocratic and elite 
policy coalitions, who have sought anticipated electoral and political rewards by providing 
solutions to persistent socioeconomic problems. 
 Despite clear and differentiated social policy trajectories across Latin America in the last 
two decades, these paths of reform are not set in stone. Given the fluctuation of party system 
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institutionalization in Latin America (Roberts 2014), dynamics affecting party systems may have 
ripple effects on policy inputs throughout the region. Since 1990, many party systems once 
characterized as institutionalized underwent systematic decay or outright collapse (such as 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) that ushered in periods of populism and 
significant shifts in economic and social policy. In addition, there remain countries – such as 
Honduras – that appear to be on a path towards volatility and collapse after years of remarkable 
party stability. Even so, among the gradual reformers – such as Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, 
Mexico, and Uruguay – the party systems within these countries appear to remain relatively 
stable and electoral competition robust. Nonetheless, given the overarching trends of 
deinstitutionalization and decay throughout the region in the past two decades, it is likely that the 
all too familiar Latin American concoction of populism with unpredictable and sudden shifts in 
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